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 CHRISTOPHER ATWOOD
 (Bloomington)
 NATIONAL PARTY AND
 LOCAL POLITICS IN ORDOS,
 INNER MONGOLIA (1926-1935)
 At the beginning of spring 1929, a lama was cremated in Üüshin
 banner, on the Ordos plateau. After the fire burned out the attend-
 ants gathered the remnants of his bones and, mixing these sacred rel-
 ics with earth, interred them in a small pagoda designed to hold the
 remnants of holy men* An unridden horse was released on the steppe
 for the liberation of the lama's soul, while the living monks held serv-
 ices in the temple. Afterwards the monks were served tea and fed a
 meal at the expense of the banner government; to sponsor such an
 event was to earn merit for the whole community (Buyan et al. 1982:
 396). Such state sponsored funerals for clerics took place often in
 Mongolia, but what made this funeral different from others was that
 the deceased had been not only a lama, but also the real ruler of his
 banner for the last two and one-half years of his life, and that he had
 ruled the banner not in the name of the Mongols' Yellow Church, but
 in the name of his "Red Party" ( ula'an nam), the Inner Mongolian
 People's Revolutionary Party.
 The lama, named Öljeijirgal, had been active in the politics of his
 banner since almost 1900 and had played a leading role in the organi-
 zation of "circles" ( duguiiang ), which eventually became an alternate
 focus of power within the banner. The duguiiang circles were so
 called from their custom of sitting in a circle when they met, usually
 at a Buddhist temple or sacrificial cairn ( obo'a ). When signing their
 names they also signed them in a circle. By doing so no leader could
 * I would like to thank David Faure and György Kara for reading drafts of this
 paper and offering many valuable criticisms and suggestions.
 JAH 26/1 (1992)
 2 CHRISTOPHER ATWOOD
 be singled out for punishment by the authorities. Although they
 started out as assemblies to petition the ruling nobles, especially after
 1900, the duguilangs began to arm themselves and from that time
 until about 1915 in effect controlled most of the banner's military
 forces. By this time the pretence of being leaderless circles was no
 longer necessary, as the leaders relied on armed force to defend them-
 selves, but the name persisted as did the custom of meeting in circles
 at cairns and temples.
 Aided by Chinese troops, the ruling grand duke of the Üüshin ban-
 ner, Tegiis-Amugulang, finally suppressed the duguilangs in 1921
 and imprisoned öljeijirgal. He later escaped and fled to Beijing,
 whence he returned five years later, not with an army at his back, but
 with a party. With the aid of this "Red Party", Öljeijirgal seized con-
 trol of the banner and revived the old duguilang organs under new
 auspices. Despite what appeared to be striking initial successes, how-
 ever, fitting the local duguilang circles, which had never looked be-
 yond their own region, together with a party which aspired to mobi-
 lize all of Inner Mongolia proved to be difficult. The difficulties in-
 creased when the party center itself, whose creation was largely a
 result of the Nationalist alliance with the Soviet Union (and its satel-
 lite Outer Mongolia) in the years 1923-1927, split between pro- and
 anti-Soviet factions. In the end, the duguilang government merged so
 closely with local society, that its final abolition by the Suiyuan pro-
 vincial government in 1935 was an anti-climax.
 The Inner Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party was a party
 for all Inner Mongols and aspired to lead local organizations beyond
 their limited horizons, to modernize Inner Mongolia, and to educate
 the Mongolian children in secular, not religious schools. That in the
 end it became identified with the local society it hoped to transcend
 raises many questions about the relations between a party that
 aimed to reform a whole nation and its powers of social and military
 mobilization which grew out of regional society.
 The Formation of the PRPIM
 This "Red Party" began as the first vehicle of common political
 activity by the Mongols of Inner Mongolia since the seventeenth cen-
 tury. Having lost their independence to the Manchus in stages from
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 1636 on, the Mongols were divided into banners ruled by a hereditary
 nobility that had no power above them but the Beijing Court of De-
 pendencies ( lijan yuan). In the late seventeenth century the Manchus
 encouraged adjacent banners to organize themselves into Leagues;
 the ruling nobles of the banners would choose the League head and
 his deputy, subject to the approval of the Manchu Qing authorities.
 At the same time, Governors General in Suiyuan, Chengde, Uliyasu-
 tai, Xining, and elsewhere, acquired regional power, standing be-
 tween the leagues and banners, and their theoretical supervisor, the
 Court of Dependencies in Beijing.
 During the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the
 leagues, which corresponded well to the native cultural areas of the
 Mongols, continued to grow apart and develop distinctive literate
 and folk cultures. In East Mongolia, the Mongols of Josotu, were in-
 fluenced by the Confucian critique of Buddhism which had, by the
 time of the Russo-Japanese war, become the scene of a movement of
 modernization that took inspiration from the reforms of Meiji Japan
 (Nacinbatu 1987). The four leagues of Khalkha in Outer Mongolia
 came under the most profound Tibetan influence and, to a unique de-
 gree, identified their nationhood with their great reincarnate lama,
 the Jibdzündamba Khutugtu. The people of Ordos, south of the
 great bend of the Yellow River, took the name of their league from
 the bier of Chinggis Khan, which was fixed there, paid great respect
 to the powerful ancestors of the Mongolian nation, along with the
 Buddhist church.
 Everywhere, except among the literate elite of East Mongolia and
 among the Daurs of the Northeast, however, the Yellow Church
 (shira shashin ) played a crucial role. Practiced by monks of the Dge-
 lugs-pa order of Buddhism also dominant in Tibet, the Buddhist reli-
 gion supplied an alternate locus of power and advancement to the
 secular nobility, and at least potentially an alternative locus of politi-
 cal action. Only the Khalkha Mongols, however, took advantage of
 this potentiality; in November 1911, as the Qing was busy coping
 with rebellions in central China, the secular and clerical elite of the
 Khalkhas, encouraged by St. Petersburg, implemented a plan that
 had been discussed intermittently since 1900, and declared Khalkha
 Mongolia an independent state. The new emperor was not one of the
 nobles, descendants of Chinggis Khan, but rather the incarnate lama,
 the eighth Jibdzündamba Khutugtu (r. 1874-1924), around whose
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 lineage as we noted, the Khalkhas had concentrated their feeling of
 separateness since its appearance in the seventeenth century.
 The new state eventually foundered in the conflict between the sec-
 ular and the clerical elite, and by 1919, Chinese troops had reoccupied
 the capital Khüriye. In response, members of the Lower House of the
 advisory parliament of Mongolia created the first political party in
 Mongolian history, the Mongolian People's Party, which proceeded
 to seek aid from Soviet Russia to re-establish Mongolian independ-
 ence (Ewing 1980). When the Chinese government also abolished
 autonomy in the Khölön Buir region, along the Chinese Eastern
 Railway, another party, the Khölön Buir Youth Party also sprang up,
 and like the People's Party, it too sought aid from Soviet Russia.
 Both of these parties, however, were local organizations, intended not
 to mobilize the whole Mongolian nation, but only the citizens of the
 defunct autonomous governments of Outer Mongolia and Khölön
 Buir.
 In Outer Mongolia, the Red Army did intervene, but only after,
 and because, the Chinese soldiers had been driven out by a White
 Russian army. The re-establishment of an independent Mongolia,
 this time as a constitutional monarchy, with real power not in the
 hands of the Jibdzündamba Khutugtu, but rather in the hands of the
 People's Party, however, exercised little immediate influence on In-
 ner Mongolia. Several Inner Mongols from Urad and Bargu (includ-
 ing members of the Youth Party) banners on the border of Outer
 Mongolia did go to the capital Neislel Khüriye (Russian "Urga") to
 join in the building of the new state. Significantly, party construction
 was still tied to a particular political organization, not a nation; nei-
 ther the Khalkhas nor their Inner Mongolian acolytes made any at-
 tempt to extend the People's Party to Inner Mongolia. Rather those
 Inner Mongolians who wished to join it had to travel to Neislel
 Khüriye.
 The organization of the first Mongolian party not connected with
 a particular governmental structure came in 1924, under the influ-
 ence of the Mongolian People's Party, but even more of the Chinese
 Nationalists (in Mongolian, the party was named the Inner Mongoli-
 an People's Party; in Chinese, the Inner Mongolian Nationalist Par-
 ty). From the beginning the party represented the coalition of several
 local movements each of which had members, for various reasons, liv-
 ing in Beijing (Atwood 1990). In the leading position was a group of
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 East Mongolian, and more particularly Kharacin intellectuals who
 had come to dominate the Mongolian educational apparatus set up
 in Beijing around the Mongolian and Tibetan school. Led by Sereng-
 dongrub (a.k.a. Bai Yunti, 1894-1980), most of the members of this
 faction had already joined the KMT. Another clique consisted of the
 old Youth Party from Khölön Buir. Most of its active members had
 followed Buyangerel (a.k.a. Fumingtai, b. 1894) to Khalkha after a
 crackdown by the Heilongjiang military, but one leader, Merse
 (a.k.a. Guo Daofu, 1894-1931?), had gone to Beijing, where he com-
 mitted his old party to join the new one. The third faction, and the
 one most relevant to our purposes, was the duguilang activists who
 had arrived in Beijing as fugitives. The leading one, Bandid Gegeen
 Wangdannima (1872-1926), was an incarnate lama, who - after ex-
 tensive activity in Northern Ordos against land colonization by
 Chinese, princely abuse of power, and in favor of the new Outer Mon-
 golian state - had been captured in 1913 and sentenced to death by
 the Governor General of Suiyuan. The Chinese President, Yuan Shi-
 kai, however, feared the effect of the execution of one who was not
 only a popular leader, but also an incarnate lama, and the uncle of
 the head of Yekhe Juu League, might have on the Chinese govern-
 ment's reputation in Mongolia. Yuan pardoned the cleric and even
 arranged a sinecure for him as an advisor to the Prime Minister on
 Mongolian affairs, but all on the condition that he not leave Beijing
 (Baoyintu 1986: 40-41). In 1921, he was joined by the lama men-
 tioned above, öljeijirgal (1866-1929), who was also known as Shine-
 lama, or "New Lama". For their part, Shinelama and Wangdannima
 committed the duguilang movement to the support of the new party
 in 1924.
 Under the Inner Mongols' situation of prolonged disunity, a party,
 something that united people from different banners and leagues for
 political action, was an unprecedented form of organization. The In-
 ner Mongolian People's Party, the first party in Inner Mongolia,
 united people from many different banners, who had in common only
 the fact that they were living in Beijing and were dissatisfied with the
 state of Inner Mongolia. However, the fact that the founders of the
 party were living in Beijing did not necessarily mean they had cut off
 ties from their local societies; indeed it was their presumed ability to
 mobilize support in their homelands that made the party more than a
 clique of expatriates. At the same time, by being in Beijing, the activ-
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 ists (especially those who were fugitives, such as Wangdannima, 01-
 jeijirgal, and Merse), could not keep up regular ties with their own
 region, due to the very poor state of comunications in Mongolian re-
 gions. When the party's central executive committee went to Ordos
 in summer of 1926, for example, it lost all contact with external polit-
 ical events and returned to Baotou two months later, unaware of the
 start of the Nationalists' Northern Expedition, or the return of their
 patron Feng Yuxiang from the Soviet Union (Nozu 1986: 137). What
 enabled these out of touch expatriates to commit - reliably as it
 turned out - their hometown organization to the new party was not
 only their high reputation in these movements, but also their thor-
 ough immersion in the culture of that hometown which meant that
 their instincts and responses did not appreciably diverge from those
 of their hometown constituency.
 The new party did attempt to homogenize the ideology, if not of its
 leaders, such as Serengdongrub, or Wangdannima, then of the youth
 attracted to its cause. The leadership selected four Mongols to join
 the first class at the Nationalists' Huangpu Military Academy; all of
 them hailed from East Mongolia. At the same time, they sent three
 Mongols to the new Khalkha Mongolian state; of these, at least two,
 öljeijirgal, who had been recommended to the leadership by Wang-
 dannima, and Rabdan, the son of a ruling duke, were Ordos Mongols.
 On the way, öljeijirgal, who was more than fifty at the time, secretly
 returned to his Üüshin banner and picked up sixteen younger dugui-
 lang activists, including his son Gungga, to study with him (Buyan et
 al. 1982: 249-253; Nozu 1986: 118). One year of modern education,
 though, that only capped off an entire childhood in a still pre-modern
 society, could not bring about a fundamental change in the students'
 world view, a fact that became clear later on.
 During 1925, the party took a decisive movement leftwards. This
 move had its source both in Mongolian and in Chinese politics. After
 the last Jibdziindamba Khutugtu died in May 1924, the Mongolian
 People's Party moved steadily leftwards and, by the end of 1924, had
 abolished the monarchy and established the Mongolian People's Re-
 public (MPR). The party was renamed the Mongolian People's Revo-
 lutionary Party (MPRP), and the capital's name changed from Neis-
 lel Khüriye ("Capital Court") to Ulaanbaatar Khota ("City of the
 Red Hero"). The Inner Mongolian party followed their northern
 brethren's lead and renamed their party the People's Revolutionary
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 Party of Inner Mongolia (PRPIM - in Chinese, the Inner Mongolian
 National Revolutionary Party). Meanwhile, after Feng Yuxiang, who
 dominated western and central Inner Mongolia, moved to accept So-
 viet and Outer Mongolian aid, a three party alliance of the National-
 ists, the Chinese Communists, and the People's Revolutionary Party
 of Inner Mongolia began to organize local party branches in Inner
 Mongolia (Sheridan 1966: 163-176; Du and Wurijitu n.d.: 187). Mil-
 itarily these branches received aid through the Feng's Guominjun or
 "National Army", and indirectly through the Soviet Union and the
 Mongolian People's Republic (Buyan et al. 1982: 251-252, 286;
 Nozu 1986: 147-149). The cooperation with the Communists
 brought a large group of Mongolian Communists, who were mostly
 from the Tiimed Mongols, the most sinicized Mongols of all, but who
 also included some from East Mongolia. Under the guidance of Li
 Dazhao this group tried to absorb the Inner Mongolian Party and
 put it under the leadership of the Chinese Communists but lacking
 Soviet and Mongolian support, these efforts were unsuccessful (Du
 and Wurijitu n. d.: 187; Nozu 1986: 152).
 On October 10 1925, the party convened its first congress at
 Zhangjiakou, the headquarters of Feng's military command (Atwood
 1990: 103-134). The congress displayed an impressive degree of uni-
 ty, considering the diversity of both the party itself and its sponsors.
 The East Mongols, who were close to the KMT, dominated the pre-
 sidium of the Central Committee, but two members of the Youth
 party also were elected, öljeijirgal and Wangdannima were chosen
 for the twenty-one man Central Committee, but not for the seven
 man presidium. Serengdongrub was elected chairman. The program
 adopted at the Congress may be summarized by its six-point over-all
 program, passed on October 14:
 1) Fully implement autonomy and self-determination for Inner
 Mongolia.
 2) Establish democratic rule.
 3) Destroy Chinese warlord rule.
 4) Abolish the feudal system.
 5) Oppose the invasion and oppression of Inner Mongolia.
 6) Purge the traitorous Mongolian princes and dukes (Nozu 1986:
 121-122).
 As can be seen, the demands at this time contained nothing that
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 contravened the spirit of the alliance between the Nationalists and
 the Soviet Union (along with the MPR). In its more detailed pro-
 gram, the party envisioned establishing an autonomous government
 for all of Inner Mongolia (meaning roughly the modern-day Inner
 Mongolia Autonomous Region, plus the northern part of Qinghai
 province, which also had a significant Mongolian population), with
 its own army and an elected head. The banner princes and the
 Chinese governors-general would have only limited power, but the
 former office would still be hereditary (Nozu 1986: 121). Strikingly, in
 view of this emphasis on creating a single government of Inner Mon-
 golia, the Soviet documents on the party often refer to the party as
 the Inner Mongolian People's Revolutionary Government, not Party
 (Nozu 1986: 147).
 More particularly though, although both parties to the alliance
 had their own ideologies (the Three People's Principle in one case,
 and Marxism-Leninism in the other), the PRPIM members had
 agreed to leave the matter of world view undetermined, even in its
 manifesto. The documents of the Congress referred neither to any
 "-ism", nor to any particular texts, such as Sim Yat-sen's lectures on
 the Three People's Principles or the works of Lenin, that explained
 how the party's practical actions were grounded in its understanding
 of the course of world or even only Mongolian history. Neither the
 Marxism of the Comintern, nor Lenin's doctrine of "non-capitalist
 development" that became the MPRP's officially approved way of
 applying Marxism to the Mongolian situation, nor the Three Peo-
 ple's Principles of the Nationalists received any mention whatsoever.
 The delegates also dispensed with any lengthy description of the
 world situation, such as had been customary in the programs and
 manifestos of the Mongolian People's (Revolutionary) Party from its
 First Congress (Ewing 1980: 234). Thus by their silence, the dele-
 gates made it clear that the PRPIM was a practical organization,
 dedicated to the creation of certain political and economic forms of
 organization in Inner Mongolia, but that it did not offer any authori-
 tative explanation of why, for example, the nobility was corrupt, or
 why imperialists were encroaching on Inner Mongolia; members had
 only to believe it was so, whatever their private reasons might be.
 Thus it is no surprise that the party saw itself as an inclusive organi-
 zation, bringing in any one who believed in the party program, rather
 than an exclusive Leninist vanguard.
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 In practice, the party placed the greatest importance on establish-
 ing its own armed force. To get the aid of Feng Yuxiang, the leaders
 agreed to put their force under the command of the Guominjun,
 alongside two units of Chinese from Inner Mongolia, which would be
 controlled by the Communists through a front organization (Nozu
 1986: 147-148). They also pledged to participate in Feng's offensive
 against Zhang Zuolin, for which they would have to wait until Nov-
 ember 22, 1925, when Zhang's lieutenant Guo Songling would, ac-
 cording to plan, betray his master and go over to the Guominjun.
 The other party leaders stayed in Zhangjiakou after the October
 Congress, while Buyangerel, the former Youth Party member who
 had fled to Khalkha in 1921 and was now on the presidium of the
 PRPIM, went to Ulaanbaatar to arrange a shipment of rifles. When
 Guo rebelled as planned, Murungga (a.k.a. Yue Jingtao, 1880/1885-
 c. 1940) and other Central Committee members moved to Kheshig-
 ten banner, in the westernmost part of the Juu Uda league, itself on
 the western limit of Zhang Zuolin's control. There, where Murung-
 ga's father was the de facto ruler of the banner, the party set up a
 military academy and, starting with the Kheshigten banner's militia,
 began collecting and training a military force; the force grew to
 about six hundred poorly armed Mongolian cavalrymen in the first
 week or so.
 The method of participation of the PRPIM in this offensive
 showed clearly what was to be the favored method of the party's mo-
 bilization. The party preferred to bring over as units the local mili-
 tary forces and only worry about their ideological level later. Fast
 growth in quantity took precedence over improving the quality of
 forces, both in terms of ability to fight and in terms of ideological
 commitment. Moreover, party leaders had to be assigned work not
 by their special expertise, but by their native areas. The Comintern
 agent assigned to the party, Aleksandr Ivanovich Ochirov, felt that
 Murungga, son of an official in Kheshigten banner and standing
 member of the Central Committee, was a diligent party worker, but
 not as good a military leader as Sainbayar (a.k.a. Bao Yueqing,
 1896-1939) from Khorchin. Even so, since the attack on Zhang
 Zuolin was based in Kheshigten banner, Murungga had to lead the
 party's battalion, while Sainbayar was sent to do underground party
 work in Khorchin, which was occupied by Zhang's troops (Nozu
 1986: 151-152).
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 As later proved usual for the party, initial success in the campaign
 was swift but lasting results few. The six hundred cavalry troops re-
 cruited in the Kheshigten base received about three hundred rifles
 from the Mongolian People's Republic on November 16, and after
 about a week of training, set out against 1,500 of Zhang's local garri-
 son troops, who were of mixed Chinese and Mongolian origin. Within
 a month most of these troops had surrendered to the PRPIM's
 forces, or fled, and the surrendered troops along with new recruits
 from the local militias, brought the party's military force up to about
 3,000. Also in taking three counties, Jingpeng, Linxi, and Wudan,
 they had seized seven artillery pieces. Social measures were limited to
 the torture and execution of several Chinese officials who had been
 involved in land colonization projects sponsored by the government
 (Nozu 1986: 148-149; Odkhonbilig 1981: 346-349).
 These successes, however, left no permanent mark. Only twenty
 party members had been assigned to officer the brigade and Ochirov
 noted in his report: "Political work is very weak, the reason being
 that there is no organization of political workers. Printed material is
 extremely rare. The party central committee should urgently send
 some pamphlets" (Nozu 1986: 150). When Zhang Zuolin defeated
 Guo Songling and Feng's army retreated first to Beijing and then to
 Nankou, the force built up in Inner Mongolia disintegrated as fast as
 it came together. By January 1926, the PRPIM brigade headquart-
 ers had retreated west from Kheshigten to Dolonna'ur; of the forty
 students who had been enrolled in the party's military academy, only
 four showed up in the new location (Nozu 1986: 129). Since the party
 had relied almost totally on military success, military failure meant it
 left no underground organization or ideological influence whatsoever.
 By August the party had followed the Guominjun's retreat to Baó-
 tou, the largest city in Western Inner Mongolia. Here, just north of
 Ordos, the party began anew the process of building a local base that
 could be the nucleus of a government. The failure in East Mongolia
 weakened the influence of the Nationalist faction and strengthened
 that of the Communists, but most importantly the decision to make
 Ordos the new center of activity meant that Wangdannima, öljeijir-
 gal, and the duguilang leaders would begin to play a major role.
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 The PRPIM and the Ordos Duguilang Movement
 Organizing the duguilang movement had begun shortly after the
 debacle in East Mongolia. Öljeijirgal and Wangdannima had been
 sent back to Ordos to begin organization early in 1926, and in Febru-
 ary 1926, Öljeijirgal had organized seven party cells (e'iir, literally
 "nests") at a grand meeting of 2,000 duguilang members at Gala'utu
 Temple. But as the representatives of these cells met again at the
 temple in March to elect a banner party committee, the grand duke
 of Üüshin, Tegüs-Amugulang, sent another duguilang army, that he
 had co-opted, to arrest them. Öljeijirgal escaped back to Baotou, and
 he and Wangdannima asked duguilang organizations that they had
 connections with to send young men to be trained in Baotou (Buyan
 et al. 1982: 275 -282; Altan-Orgil 1989: 533-534). That summer, as
 the Central Committee arrived at Baotou as well, the People's Revo-
 lutionary Army of Inner Mongolia (PRAIM) was officially estab-
 lished; as Ordos was Wangdannima's territory, he became the com-
 mander-in-chief.
 In late August 1926, although Wangdannima had died in the mean-
 time, the army was strong enough to march out and bully the recalci-
 trant banner chiefs into allowing the PRPIM to freely arm and or-
 ganize. A fair number of those trained in Kheshigten had eventually
 made their way west to Baotou, where they were combined with the
 recruits from Ordos. Receiving a new batch of several hundred re-
 peating rifles and even a few machine-guns from the Mongolian Peo-
 ple's Republic, as well as training from experienced Red Army and
 Guominjun officers, the new force, small though it was, represented a
 qualitative leap in military strength in the largely disarmed Ordos re-
 gion. Aside from the Ordos forces, East Mongols who had studied in
 Ulaanbaatar or at the academy in Kheshigten accompanied the expe-
 dition as a twenty-five man political department; this presumably
 aided discipline and political awareness, although its results seem to
 have been mixed. In Üüshin, Otog, and Khanggin banners previously
 stubborn nobles became suddenly pliable as a far larger and better
 equipped army than any banner head had ever commanded marched
 through their territories. In Üüshin, Sainbayar, the CEC's special
 representative brokered a trilateral agreement between the PRPIM
 party center, the duguilangs (represented by öljeijirgal) and Grand
 Duke Tegüs-Amugulang.
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 The eventual organization in Ordos bore a close resemblance to the
 old duguilang organizations. The larger banners were divided into re-
 gions each controlled by one duguilang militia. The duguilangs thus
 seem to have been groups of interested locals who assembled and vol-
 unteered to perform military and political tasks that, it was felt, the
 banner government was not performing. In Üüshin, twelve dugui-
 langs ruled the banner until 1921, when the then new grand duke,
 Tegüs-Amugulang, crushed the movement and imprisoned öljeijir-
 gal with the aid of troops of a county commander in nearby Shaanxi
 province. In Otog, eight duguilangs had appeared by 1905, and dis-
 putes between them eventually caused the intervention of the league
 government (Liu 1984: 167-168; Buyan et al. 1982: 257-260). In
 Üüshin, however, the duguilangs had elected representatives to as-
 semble at Gala'utu Temple as a Gonghui (Mong. olan-u jöblel, al-
 though Mongolian documents often use the Chinese term as well), or
 "public council" that decided major issues (Altan-Orgil 1989: 538-
 539).
 When the duguilangs were revived by the party, the latter's organi-
 zation by cells fell into this same pattern. The original seven cells
 were expanded to seventeen, and the Public Council was in name re-
 vived in the form of trilateral conferences between the old banner of-
 ficials, the party representatives from each cell, and the army. The
 resolutions of these conferences, though, were addressed directly to
 the party cells. The party cells, thus, were not the hidden backbone of
 other public organizations; rather, they were the basic organs of ad-
 ministration, a group of interested supporters of the new regime who
 shouldered administrative tasks on its behalf in a given region. Thus,
 the cells were assigned specific numbers of students to supply to the
 new schools, specific numbers of trees to plant in sandy areas, and
 contributions to the military (Altan-Orgil 1989: 528-531). In a tell-
 ing mistake, one party document stated that after Öljeijirgal's assas-
 sination, the party cells were increased from twelve to nineteen (Al-
 tan-Orgil 1989: 540), when actually, as elsewhere stated, the number
 at Öljeijirgal's death was seventeen (Altan-Orgil 1989: 535); clearly
 the author had confused the seventeen party cells with the old twelve
 duguilangs of Üüshin.
 Real power in Üüshin lay more in the hands of the army than of
 the party. Öljeijirgal never held the position of chairman of the party
 committee which went to Tümenjirgal, or secretary general which
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 went to Sodnamdongrub (b. 1875); instead he was commander ( tuan -
 zhang) of the PRAIM's twelfth regiment (tuan), which was the for-
 mal name of the Üüshin army (Buyan et al. 1982: 276; Altan-Orgil
 1989: 534). After one of the Üüshin soldiers, allegedly conspiring with
 the nearby Chinese county commander Jing Yuexiu, shot öljeijirgal
 in his sleep on Lunar New Year's Day 1929, neither of the party lead-
 ers succeeded him, but Möngkhe-Öljei, the deputy commander or
 tuanfu of Öljeijirgal's Twelfth Regiment (Buyan et al. 1982: 321-
 322, 401). Eventually Möngkhe-Öljei elevated himself to chairman of
 the Public Council and promoted his deputy Kheshigdalai to com-
 mander of the army; the old party chiefs Tiimenjirgal and Sodnam-
 dongrub were replaced by Arbinbayar, a former military commander
 (Buyan et al. 1982: 417).
 This army differed from other local forces by being much larger as
 well as better armed; late in 1926, the party center had provided
 them with more than a hundred "pearl-string" ( lianzhu ), or repeat-
 ing rifles, and once having been armed they were able to capture
 more weapons from their enemies. Before the arrival of Öljeijirgal,
 the total banner army was less than thirty men. After the arrival of
 the PRAIM and the signing of the trilateral agreement in summer
 1926, the party leaders left behind with Öljeijirgal one political com-
 missar, Lhunrub, Wangdannima's former secretary, and Jirgal from
 Kheshigten banner, as the staff officer (Buyan et al. 1982: 348).
 These two "foreigners", along with the volunteers who had been
 trained in Baotou in spring-summer 1926, constituted the core of the
 new army. With recruitment in Üüshin banner, this core soon ex-
 panded to more than one hundred, and later reached a peak at almost
 one hundred fifty (Odkhonbilig 1981: 353; Altan-Orgil 1989: 543,
 549). The volunteer nature of this force marked a large difference
 from the regular banner armies which were filled as a state obligation
 on a rotating basis. The volunteer army was seen as very threatening
 by the old banner elite; it was thought to be more likely to intervene
 in political issues than a randomly picked, draft force. Thus, after old
 party organizations were abolished by the Suiyuan governors office
 in 1935, and the old institutions revived, special attention was paid to
 making sure the militia would not accept volunteers and that the
 army would not involve itself in quarrels (Altan-Orgil 1989: 552-
 553).
 Another feature of the military organization that diverged from
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 orthodox practice was the recruitment of lamas; the commander of
 the army, Öljeijirgal, was himself a lama. Moreover, the new regula-
 tions specifically provided that those lamas who were not living in
 monasteries and not celibate (usually the sizeable majority in Mon-
 golia) would be drafted as army doctors (Altan-Orgil 1989: 530). The
 league head demonstrated against allowing lamas to bear arms, and
 the new regulations issued in 1935 specifically forbade it (Altan-Orgil
 1989: 522, 553).
 Ideologically the party had to deal with the ambivalence of the
 Mongolian people to any idea or institution associated with the
 Republican revolution of 1911. Educated writers, especially when
 appealing to Chinese authorities, tried to win them over by a wealth
 of Confucian allusions which overtly suggested that a true Republi-
 can government would fulfill the old promise of Yao and Shun, but
 also implied that the writers viewed the republic as an essentially
 Chinese form of government. One petition from a duguilang group in
 1921, pleads in its preface: "According to the heavenly rule of the ear-
 ly Yao and Shun . . . bring the situation back into harmony with the
 all embracing rules of the Three Bonds and the Five Constant Vir-
 tues . . ." (Serruys 1978: 14). No duguilang document from the Qing
 has such heavy Confucian imagery, not even those written five or ten
 years earlier. A common argument compared the convoking of a par-
 liament to the gathering of scholars that marked a just reign; thus
 one Ordos poet writing around 1915 wrote:
 All of them, Chinese, Manchu, Mongolian, Muslim, and Tibetan
 Are clearly the five large races of this time.
 The Monarchy will disintegrate and a party assembly be called
 So that a people's rule that respects the learned may be founded
 (Sainjirgal and Sharaldai 1984: 113, cf. 8).
 By the same token, others attacked the system of hereditary nobility
 in the name of these Confucian-Republican principles:
 We beg General Hsü to consider that the ruling princes of the ban-
 ners not only were not educated to rule the nation, but, because of
 their hereditary position, unjustly oppress the loyal common peo-
 ple who lead an ordinary life. The ruling princes levy illegal taxes,
 break with virtue and ignore righteousness. They alienate the
 scholars, and associate with the flatterers. They forget the three
 principles and the five constant virtues. They think only of pleas-
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 ure. This does not suit present needs. It would be a good idea to
 abolish the hereditary ruling princes, to dismiss the uneducated
 and stupid ruling princes and to hold elections as do other nations
 in the world (Onon 1976: 158-159).
 Those friendly to the hereditary principle warned that under the Re-
 public the nobles would have to be extra careful if they hoped to keep
 their thrones.
 In the Mongolian banners and leagues of the many outer prov-
 inces,
 The decrees of the sovereign dukes and lords are held as highest.
 Consider the revolution and the present day so hostile to this prin-
 ciple
 And deign to help all the Mongolian lineage (Sainjirgal and Sharal-
 dai 1984: 114).
 The people, though, held an aversion to the whole idea of a re-
 public regardless of its Confucian or anti-Confucian message. In pop-
 ular terms this aversion settled on a few concepts that aroused dis-
 gust. Gaming, the Mongolian pronunciation of Chinese geming, "re-
 volution", as well as its Mongolian caique translation, boshug-i
 khalakhu meaning "changing the mandate", had become more or less
 synonymous with bandit, while irgen ulus, the approved Mongolian
 translation of minguo, or "republic" suffered from also meaning
 "Chinese country" ( irgen in Mongolian meant both "subject" and
 "Chinese"). The idea of a republic had become associated very
 strongly with the idea of Chinese ethnicity; for most of the rural
 Mongols, this meant it was basically unacceptable.
 As the Mongols, unlike the Chinese, had not cut off their queues,
 this also served as a symbol to focus popular feeling on the republic
 as foreign. In 1926, one opponent of öljeijirgal's duguilang regime
 cut off his queue to express his loyalty to the Chinese warlord Jing
 Yuexiu in Yulin, just south of Üüshin. On returning to the banner, the
 locals mocked him in song:
 The five ministers, and ten colonels
 Have lived in vain it seems [i.e. the regular banner offices have
 been superseded]
 Tumi Dandar, holding fifty soldiers
 Has gone quite bald it seems
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 Even though the morals of
 The soldiers of the Zhonghua Minguo spread,
 Are not the six rulers and the seven banners [of Ordos]
 All caught up in a trap?
 As the unprincipled flatterers
 Become ever more,
 Do they not harass
 Us righteous many folk? (Buyan et al. 1982: 327-328).
 Note that the name of the Republic of China is given in Chinese
 {zhonghua minguo); this clearly expressed the perceived ethnic identi-
 ty of republican institutions.
 The problem for the Mongolian revolutionaries was that what they
 supported looked essentially like the gainings' own program. Even by
 the fall of 1921, some hot-heads in the Revolutionary ( boshug-i kha-
 lakhu) Youth League had created a great furor by cutting off queues
 and banning women's head ornaments (Lhamsüren 1984: 93-94;
 Onon 1976: 185). These measures were hastily revoked, and the Mon-
 golian People's Party tried to solve at least some of the semantic
 issues. They began to translate "revolution" as khubiskhal, a word
 which actually suggested "metamorphosis", and "republic" by
 bügüde nairamdakhu ulus, a caique translation of Chinese gongheguo,
 an alternate term for Republic. But even thus renamed, the Mongols
 in Ordos retained a lingering distrust of republican institutions and
 ideas. Further distrust focused on the anti-religious policy of the
 Comintern sponsors of the party. At the first Ordos party branch
 congress, one delegate asked: "They say that the Outer Mongols un-
 der the Communist rule have abolished religion. Is this true?" (Nozu
 1986: 137). No answer to this question is recorded although the Cen-
 tral Committee representatives surely denied it (at the time it was
 not true, although by the 1930s it would be). Although the PRPIM
 propaganda did not make much of it, their red star and red flag sym-
 bolized republican goals: "Let us cover the whole orb of the world/
 with our red republican ( bügüde nairamdakhu ) flag" ran the lyrics to
 one party song, sung to the tune of the "Internationale" ( Ediinkheshig,
 et al. 1981: 387). But if they avoided these touchy cultural issues,
 then they left the party with very little that, on a local level, distin-
 guished it from simple duguilang movements.
 JAH 26/1 (1992)
 NATIONAL PARTY AND LOCAL POLITICS IN ORDOS 17
 Even those sixteen Ordos men, who went with Öljeijirgal to Ulaan-
 baatar in 1924, showed little interest in abstract ideological disputes.
 The behavior of the duguilang leaders in ideological disputes within
 the party's Central Committee was almost entirely passive. As the
 party was being torn apart by the split between the pro-Soviet and
 the pro-Nationalist factions, the Ordos leaders, as the representatives
 of the major grass-roots movement, were often called upon to give
 their support to one or the other line. Möngkhe-Öljei, Öljeijirgal's
 leading lieutenant, Jamiyangshirab (a.k.a. Zhang Wenxian, 1897-
 1946), another incarnate lama and the duguilang leader of Otog ban-
 ner, Rabdan (a.k.a. Qi Zi jun, 1901-1932), the son of the duke of
 Je'üngar banner and chairman of the PRPIM's Ordos committee,
 and other duguilang activists first participated in an emergency con-
 ference in Feng's new headquarters, Ningxia. Serengdongrub, the
 leading pro-Nationalist and chairman of the Central Committee,
 called the conference in July 1927, largely to suspend his enemy
 Merse and to pass rules that would prevent the Comintern from
 packing the forthcoming expanded emergency conference in Ulaan-
 baatar, scheduled for one month later. The Ordos representatives
 passed the required motions and Serengdongrub demanded what he
 thought were his obedient tools follow him to that conference. While
 there, however, they were captured by the Comintern representative
 Amugayev, who got an almost entirely new left-wing Central Com-
 mittee elected - Möngkhe-Öljei even ended up replacing Serengdon-
 grub as the new chairman of the Central Committee! Serengdongrub
 escaped to Inner Mongolia and managed to keep control of the army
 and organs of the party in Ningxia. The chairman Möngkhe-Öljei,
 Jamiyangshirab, and the other Ordos delegates, their usefulness to
 the Comintern over, spent the next few months sitting in their hotel,
 reading the works of Marx and Lenin (Liu 1984: 169-170).
 Nor did this study have any markedly positive effect on their polit-
 ical vigor. By winter, they requested to return home and were al-
 lowed to do so, apparently only after surrendering their new dignities
 as Central Committee members. They apparently travelled straight
 to Ningxia where Serengdongrub's East Mongolian supporters
 promptly threw them in jail. The duguilang leaders only escaped
 thanks to the intervention of their Ordos compatriot, Rabdan, who
 had been neutral in the Nationalist-Comintern dispute but had very
 good personal connections with Feng Yuxiang. Upon returning, Ja-
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 miyangshirab quickly re-established his position as the de facto ruler
 of Otog banner, but held a lasting grudge against anyone associated
 with the PRPIM, regardless of faction. Möngkhe-Öljei returned to
 Ordos, and there is no indication that öljeijirgal viewed his less than
 heroic venture into national party politics as any disqualification for
 local leadership; he stayed on as second in command, and after Öljei-
 jirgal's assassination took over the leadership of Üüshin banner.
 Öljeijirgal himself, who in modern Inner Mongolian sources, is al-
 ways portrayed as a staunch supporter of the leftist line, saw no harm
 in compromising with the Nationalists. In 1928, Mandaltu (a.k.a. Li
 Danshan: 1892-1945), from East Mongolia and a pro-Nationalist,
 appeared in Üüshin with the force directly under Serengdongrub's
 anti-Comintern party center, informed the Üüshin army that they
 could no longer do whatever they wanted, but had to take orders
 from the Nationalists. As a token of this submission the soldiers
 would have to replace the five-pointed red star on their shoulders
 with the Nationalists' white sun on blue sky. Öljeijirgal and his du-
 guilang supporters had no intention of following this advice, but their
 reasoning showed that they also had no wish to take a national, ideo-
 logical stand. One, Saishingga, reacted angrily to Mandaltu's demand:
 "We've done more than enough work. With so many men and horses,
 how can we listen to him tell us we can't run our own affairs and have
 to submit to the Guomindang? This is impossible!" öljeijirgal made
 no open resistance but privately calmed his subordinates: "We
 mustn't surrender to the Guomindang. Let them go their way, we'll
 go ours" (Buyan et al. 1982: 365-367). A 1930 letter from Üüshin
 summarizing the party branch's history painted the struggle as one
 of right versus left, but this very document was written in an effort to
 persuade the left-wing Central Committee in Ulaanbaatar to give aid
 (Altan-Orgil 1989: 535). At the time, the Üüshin men, angry or not,
 viewed the demand to take on the Nationalist colors not as an ideo-
 logical abomination, but as a threat to their local autonomy. Even-
 tually Öljeijirgal proposed a compromise; those who wished to
 change their shoulder ornaments could, those who didn't need not
 change them. As for himself, he said, he had always worn a Mongolian
 robe with no emblems at all, so there was no point in putting one on
 now. The red star and the white sun co-existed nervously in Üüshin,
 until Mandaltu's army received orders from Serengdongrub to bring
 öljeijirgal back to Ningxia by any means possible. In the attempt to
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 carry this out, the two armies clashed, and the pro-KMT army fled
 back to Ningxia in defeat.
 The main cultural issue on which the revolutionaries had to pre-
 varicate in the face of overwhelming opposition was religion. As we
 have seen above, the association with the Soviet Union and the Mon-
 golian People's Republic made many Mongols instinctively suspect
 an anti-religious bias in the party. The CEC, dominated by National-
 ist East Mongols, adopted a policy by which "both the yellow (cleri-
 cal) and black (lay) feudalists" ( khara shira ilgal ügei ) could join, if
 they sincerely supported the aims of the party. In their popular prop-
 aganda, the party not only did not criticize Buddhism, but actively
 advocated it. Party songs followed the call to raise the red flag, with a
 parallel one to raise the yellow flag (Ediinkheshig, et al. 1981: 384).
 One song issued by the CEC even suggested that it was this people's
 party which would finally bring the Daurs and Solon Ewenkis into
 the faith. Many Mongols viewed these groups as not quite Mongo-
 lian, because they had never adopted Buddhism. The party could es-
 tablish the intra-Mongolian unity necessary to victory by bringing
 them into the church (Edünkheshig, et al. 1981: 384-385; Jagchid
 and Hyer 1979: 141-142). After the break-up of the party, Merse,
 himself a Daur, and probably not a believer, felt that as the unity of
 Khalkha had come from the common devotion to the Jibdziindamba
 Khutugtu, so Inner Mongolian leaders could use the Panchen Lama
 as a focus of Inner Mongolian unity (Taobuxin 1984: 7-8).
 In this context, it may not seem strange that Öljeijirgal's marching
 song began with the following two stanzas:
 Let us raise the red flag high
 And make the great nation flourish.
 Let us reduce to ashes
 The rebellious thieving enemy.
 Let us raise the yellow flag high
 And make the church's strength flourish
 Lay (khara) and clerical (shira) together,
 Let us crush the anarchic enemy ( Altan-Orgil 1989: 516-517).
 In fact, this song had been first composed in 1921 during the Outer
 Mongolian revolution, where gaining the support of the clergy, espe-
 cially of the Jibdziindamba Khutugtu, was crucial. Such sentiments,
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 though, meant one thing when expressed by East Mongols or Daurs,
 whose intellectual leadership was raised in a climate of academic
 anti-clericalism, and quite another when being propounded by Ordos
 leaders who were themselves lamas. For them this was by no means a
 pose adopted to calm the suspicious herdsmen, but a sincere belief.
 Moreover, the evolution of the duguilang movement previous to
 the coming of the PRPIM had revealed a particularly sharp tension,
 not between the nobles and the high lamas on the one hand ("the
 black and yellow feudalists" in the contemporary leftish jargon) and
 the people on the other, but between the nobles and the high lamas
 themselves. The Comintern representative, Ochirov, viewed this con-
 flict as the consequence of land colonization from 1900 on: Chinese
 colonization made the nobles wealthy because many of them contin-
 ued to hold bottom soil rights, upon which they collected rents, but
 impoverished the monks, because the monastic treasuries were mostly
 held as herds, which colonization hurt. Moreover, as the Mongols
 were driven out, the lamas lost the income that they used to get from
 performing services for the local population (Nozu 1986: 135). This
 analysis may be to some extent correct, although even in areas and
 times when colonization was not an issue, disputes between ruling no-
 bles and lamas often broke out over other matters. In Khanggin ban-
 ner, for example, the grand duke Altan-Ochir had been selected as an
 incarnate lama in his youth. His father had demanded that this his
 only son be allowed to grow up outside the monastery and succeed
 him as prince. When the young incarnate grand duke reached the
 throne, he delighted in wearing clerical robes and performing Bud-
 dhist services. Eventually, he had a great temple built near his resi-
 dence and forced the lamas of the banner to perform services there in
 rotation, under his direction. In 1921, the lamas of Shira Juu revolted
 and, led by the monks, appealed to the League head, who rendered
 the following decision to the grand duke: "Not only may you contin-
 ue as ruler of the banner, you may control Beile-yin Juu [the new
 temple] all by yourself, but you may not interfere in any other tem-
 ple's affairs" (Buyan, et al. 1982: 261-266). Other examples of rulers
 defeated in their attempts to centralize religious power in their own
 hands can be found in Khalkha (see Onon 1976: 5-7); the theocratic
 government of Outer Mongolia fell largely because of the nobility's
 resentment against clerical control.
 In this situation of polarization, the party center in Baotou usually
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 ended up as a captive of local interests, supplying weapons to, and
 dispatching its central army for the support of whichever local ele-
 ment it saw as most sympathetic. Calling to raise the yellow flag high
 amounted to standing on the clergy's side in issues which, while en-
 tirely peripheral to the party's stated concerns, were very important
 to the politically active segment of the Ordos people. In Khanggin
 banner mentioned above, the duguilang movement of monks re-
 mained in existence after its victory and in 1926 allied with the
 PRPIM. Thus the PRPIM organization in Khanggin ended up
 largely restricted to Shira Juu monastery. The grand duke Altan-
 Ochir temporized, but in the meanwhile a lay duguilang movement
 had sprung up over the banner government's imposition of a new fee
 on the collection of salt from one of the banner's salt lakes, and the
 grand duke's refusal to consult with the local officials. Seeing an op-
 portunity, Altan-Ochir revoked the new fee, promised to be less auto-
 cratic in the future, and designated the lay duguilang group as a
 "peace preservation militia" ( baoweituan ). Although this lay dugui-
 lang movement had made contact with the monastic duguilang and
 the IMPRP, in the end it backed the grand duke and in spring 1927,
 he used its militia to arrest the lamas and crush the PRPIM cells in
 his banner (Buyan et al. 1982: 299-312).
 In Je'üngar banner, however, the party ended up in opposition to
 the clerical power. Rabdan, one of the younger sons of the ruling
 duke, had joined Feng Yuxiang's army in 1924, studied in Ulaanbaa-
 tar, and attended the first congress of the PRPIM. When he returned
 to his banner in summer 1926, he immediately began to implement
 modernizing reforms by decree. The rights of the hereditary gentry
 ( taiji ) were abolished; the bottom soil rights of the banner govern-
 ment over the Chinese peasants, along with the rights of the banner
 government to rent further land, were abolished. Most shockingly
 though, he established secular schools, burned the sutras he had stud-
 ied in school to illustrate the impotence of blind faith, and cut off the
 Mongols' queues. The latter measure especially enraged the banner
 subjects who complained: "If you cut off our queues, we'll be the
 most ugly, ridiculous things, neither male nor female, neither clerical
 nor lay" (Buyan et al. 1982: 294-295). Rabdan's father, who feared
 that new schools were just a way station on the route to abolition of
 hereditary privilege, steered him rather into an expedition to settle a
 territorial dispute with a neighboring Shanxi county. Unfortunately
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 Yan Xishan, the Shanxi warlord, saw this attack as an opportunity to
 expand in Suiyuan at the expense of Feng's army and occupied all of
 Je'iingar, while Rabdan, with no support at home had, to flee to
 Ningxia, where Feng's new headquarters had been set up in winter
 1926. As the Mongolian People's Party found in 1921, the cultural is-
 sues, whose solution formed a constant temptation to the impatient
 revolutionary, were also the most perilous.
 On the issue of local separatism, the party center did try to impose
 its own view on the local populations. Songs issued from the party
 center stressed unity of all the Mongols above all. "Strengthening
 connections between leagues and banners" was a constant theme, and
 "The Song of All Inner Mongolia" emphasized how only the People's
 Party's red flag could, by making the weak Josotu strong, the back-
 ward Qinghai advanced, unite all the Inner Mongols (Edünkheshig et
 al. 1981: 385-388). But they had much resistance to work against, a
 lot of it inspired by the fact that the Central Committee did not fairly
 represent the Mongols as a whole. Of the seven members of the
 standing committee, five were East Mongols, one a Daur, and the
 other a Bargu. Much tension arose from the condescending attitude
 of the East Mongols towards the Ordos herdsmen (Nozu 1986: 141).
 This dominance of East Mongols and especially the three Kharachin
 banners in Inner Mongolia-wide organizations continued into the
 forties (indeed it still creates resentment today) and gave rise to
 many stories expressing the resentment of the other Mongols. In one,
 a Mongol decides to commit suicide because all the best positions are
 occupied by Kharachins, and throws himself into a well. There he
 discovers another Mongol has already jumped in and laid claim to
 the well - he too is a Kharachin ( Jagchid and Hyer 1979: 141). The
 political department of the force that entered Ordos in 1926 was re-
 ferred to as the "Central Committee's Kharachin army" (Buyan et al
 1982: 301). Thus, the party center's pleas for Mongolian unity often
 fell on deaf ears; they sounded too self-interested to be plausible.
 The party center was aware of the tendency towards localism in
 the organization, but having armed the duguilangs, it could do noth-
 ing to control them without risking an armed clash. One report to the
 Central Committee in spring 1927, detailed how öljeijirgal solely
 occupied himself with local affairs and did not pay great attention to
 connections with other banners, even at a time when the initially
 promising state of affairs in Otog, Khanggin, Jiyün Wang, and other
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 bordering banners was being reversed. Blinded by the love of power
 and ruling his banner dictatorially, he had no desire to dissipate his
 forces by intervening to help the revolution, the report said (Buyan
 et al. 1982: 354-355). In the summer of 1927, Serengdongrub invited
 öljeijirgal to his emergency conference in Ningxia, but, as we have
 seen, öljeijirgal sent his deputy Möngkhe-Öljei and others, rather
 than go himself; having returned to his banner in fall 1926, öljeijirgal
 never again left Üiishin. Serengdongrub had no way to force Öljeijir-
 gal to attend.
 Even within Ordos, disputes between banners occurred frequently,
 and, in the prevailing land shortage stemming from Chinese coloniza-
 tion, centered on tracts of disputed territory, as well as refugees from
 one banner to the next. In 1906-1907, Wangdannima, for example,
 earned the hatred of the Üüshin duguilang movements for encourag-
 ing the prince of Jiyün Wang, over whom the lama had great influ-
 ence, to seize a tract of disputed territory and settle it with refugees
 from Wangdannima's own banner, which had been hard hit by colo-
 nization (Serruys 1977: 497, 502-503). Similarly, Üüshin and Otog
 banner had a long standing land dispute that often heated up during
 times of popular agitation (Serruys 1977: 492, Serruys 1978: 2-3).
 Many refugees from Jasag banner crowded in Üüshin and, presuma-
 bly due to the hostility of the native-born duguilang activists, even-
 tually formed a large part of the army that the warlord Jing Yuexiu
 used to raid Üüshin banner (Serruys 1977: 486; Buyan et al. 1982:
 338).
 Although the party held several special conferences for work in Or-
 dos and neighboring leagues, they rarely if ever dealt with specific ac-
 tion in the various leagues. Instead, they usually ended up as vehicles
 for the pursuit of one or another national program. Thus the first
 PRPIM sponsored conference of duguilangs in Ordos (summer,
 1926) served to introduce them to the PRPIM and its policy; the sec-
 ond in July 1927, mostly served, as noted above, to criticize Merse
 and to try to prevent the Comintern from packing the Expanded
 Conference planned for August of that year. The last, held in March
 1930, was called by the Comintern to announce its new pan-Mongo-
 list line, that advocated not autonomy, as before, but complete inde-
 pendence for Inner Mongolia. Thus, the party organization never be-
 came a vehicle for the resolution of long-standing local feuds; instead,
 the local party branches were captured by them.
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 The Decline of the Üüshin Party
 Under these conditions the Üüshin party organization began to
 normalize its position with regard to the larger political society. Öljei-
 jirgal began this process after his clash with the central Committee's
 army. Since the Inner Mongolian People's Revolutionary Army was
 soon after disarmed and reconstituted as part of Feng Yuxiang's
 Guominjun, it became somewhat anachronistic to continue calling
 the Üüshin army the twelfth regiment of the PRAIM. More impor-
 tantly, to continue holding the flag of an organization which had once
 aspired to be national in scope, but which had now been dissolved,
 was a standing invitation for outside powers to intervene and rectify
 the anomalous situation.
 In fall 1928, Öljeijirgal took the opportunity of a party conference
 to rename his army the "Army of Üüshin Banner" (Buyan et al. 1982:
 376-377). Whereas national connections for a rebellious banner were
 highly advantageous in a time when revolution was everywhere and
 being materially supported with arms, they were very dangerous
 when the new Nationalist government was proclaiming law and or-
 der. At the same time he renamed the party "cells" as "villages" (ga-
 ca'a ). The party described this change as going secret, but the sort of
 secrecy implied was different from that used in underground party
 work. What became secret was not the existence of the cells them-
 selves - after all they did most of the administrative work of the ban-
 ner - but that these local administrative organs were actually cells of
 a party that claimed national significance. Once again since the revo-
 lutionary organs already functioned much like the traditional dugui-
 lang organizations, simply renaming them did make them look, at
 least from a distance, like fairly unthreatening local militia.
 Further normalization took place after öljeijirgal's death. In
 spring 1929, Möngkhe-Öljei gave his Üüshin army a pompous
 Chinese title "The Pacification and Garrison Cavalry of Üüshin Ban-
 ner" ( Wushen qi xunfang qibing) and, more significantly, informed the
 league head of this move, thus implicitly recognizing its authority
 (Buyan, et al. 1982: 410-402). He also brought to an end the long
 standing guerilla war that had droned on between the Üüshin banner
 and the Chinese warlord in Yulin, Jing Yuexiu since the winter of
 1926-1927. Although the Üüshin forces were generally victorious
 and able to keep Jing's raiding parties out of the heart of Üüshin, the
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 hostilities had interrupted trade between the two areas causing hard-
 ship to Mongol and Chinese border traders. Thus, with the latter act-
 ing as an intermediary, an agreement was signed that enabled the two
 sides to resume the mutually necessary trade.
 The main obstacle to normalization, though, lay in the fact that
 the prince had at the beginning of the hostilities fled from house
 arrest to Yulin, in Shaanxi. Until Üüshin had a ruling noble, it was
 not a normal banner; it would still be seen as being in the hands of a
 rebellious illegal gang. Now with his previous supporter, the little
 warlord Jing, making peace, Grand Duke T egüs- Amugulang had to
 travel, along with an armed escort of more than thirty men, to the
 head of the league, then the prince of Jasag banner, to plead his case.
 Möngkhe-Öljei sent a delegation of men led by the political commis-
 sar of the Üüshin army Lhunrub to persuade or compel him to re-
 turn. Only the latter course proved feasible, and the revolutionaries
 kidnapped the prince and most of his escort, butchering the latter on
 the way back to the banner. Thus in fall 1929, when commissioners
 from the Suiyuan provincial government came to investigate, they
 concluded that in this banner, as in many others, the prince was not
 competent to rule and the best step was simply to legitimize the ex-
 isting militia heads. The same policy was followed in Otog with the
 ex-IMPRP member the incarnate lama Jamiyangshirab; although he
 had broken with the PRPIM, he kept the rifles and established a
 twenty year rule over Otog banner. The Suiyuan provincial govern-
 ment had no alternative but to declare that the princes were so lazy,
 immoral and generally unfit to rule that they needed official assist-
 ants. It, thus, bestowed on both Jamiyangshirab and Möngkhe-Öljei
 the title "Assistant Director for Banner Affairs" and hereafter dealt
 with them instead of their figurehead princes (Buyan et al. 1982,
 405-412; Liu 1984: 171-172).
 The normalization of the banner was complete; the one-time revo-
 lutionaries had become simply another local militia needing to be giv-
 en recognition by the provincial government. Just at this time, how-
 ever, the party also revived its ties with the new left-wing Central
 Committee in Ulaanbaatar set up by the Comintern after the Emer-
 gency Conference of August, 1927. When Öljeijirgal was assassinated,
 Möngkhe-Öljei informed Ulaanbaatar of this setback, as well as the
 changing of cells into "villages". In fall 1929, the party center in
 Ulaanbaatar followed the more aggressive line of the Comintern in-
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 ternationally and sent secret representatives to Üüshin to explain
 that Inner Mongolia should now demand independence. The en-
 croachments of the Northeast Chinese warlord, Zhang Xueliang, on
 Soviet rights over the Chinese Eastern Railway, provoked the Soviet
 Union into encouraging any form of uprising and riots against the
 Nanjing government (Lee 1983: 95-126). In Inner Mongolia this
 meant supporting immediate rebellion and secession from the
 "Chinese imperialists" (Odkhonbilig 1981: 379; Edünkheshig et al.
 1981: 343-371). The new line did not impede the process of reinte-
 grating Üüshin into the league and provincial framework, and as an
 unexpected byproduct, perhaps, Üüshin became a safer area for par-
 ty work. The next and last party conference of the PRPIM held in
 Inner Mongolia on March 17, 1930, opened in this not openly rebel-
 lious, but in effect self-policing banner (Buyan et al. 1982: 413-416;
 Altan-Orgil 1989: 136-137).
 The most likely reason why the Üüshin government was eager to
 expand relations with the Comintern simultaneously with the exist-
 ing government of Suiyuan was military and economic necessity. The
 reintegration with the surrounding administrations had helped the
 economic situation, although as a letter sent in March 1930, to the
 Central Committee confessed, even with the bottom rent, and "grass
 tax" on Chinese farms and herds, and lacking any special natural re-
 sources, the revenues always fell short of expenditures (Altan-Orgil
 1989: 542-543). The real shortage lay in guns, of which the four com-
 panies had no more than twelve to twenty each, down from a maxi-
 mum total of one hundred forty. The letter concluded with a plea for
 guns and ammunition and hinted that Üüshin could serve as a base
 for helping the revolution along in other banners (Altan-Orgil 1989:
 549-550). Thus, the desire to maintain ties with the party center, at
 a time when the banner leadership had already largely transformed
 itself into a local militia organization, seems to have stemmed from
 the need to obtain weapons for what was, in its area, an unusually
 large military establishment.
 The aggressive line of the Comintern lasted for about two years.
 Following the utter failure of anti-Nationalist uprisings in Northeast
 China, of the "Li Lisan line" in southern China, and the inability of
 the Inner Mongolian party to foment any significant uprisings at all,
 the remaining PRPIM organizations in western Inner Mongolia
 were pushed to merge with the Chinese Communist party in Septem-
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 ber 1931 (Du and Wurijitu, n.d.: 208-210). Just about this time,
 however, the Üüshin party cells were losing touch with the Comin-
 tern. Previously, contact between Üüshin and Ulaanbaatar had been
 through underground Tiimed Mongolian cells, which in turn con-
 nected with Üüshin via Rabdan, the Je'üngar ruler's son, who had re-
 turned to his home banner in 1928. When Rabdan was murdered in a
 personal quarrel in early 1932, Üüshin banner's weakening ties with
 the conspiratorial network of revolutionary parties were finally cut.
 The final end of the Public Council government in Üüshin hap-
 pened through an appropriately confused set of local and ideological
 factors. There seems to have been a power conflict in March 1930,
 which eventually ousted Sodnamdongrub from the party secretary-
 ship, which he had held since February 1926; some sources suggest it
 sprang from Sodnamdongrub's disagreement with Möngkhe-Öljei's
 insufficiently pure revolutionary policies (Odkhonbilig 1981: 404-
 405). Be that as it may, Möngkhe-Öljei remained in control of Üüshin
 until 1935. In that year Galzangrulmawangjiljamsu, prince of Otog
 banner, became the head of the league, which meant that in effect Ja-
 miyangshirab, his "Assistant Director of Banner Affairs", became the
 pre-eminent Mongol in Ordos. Apparently, both to settle to his satis-
 faction Otog banner's long-standing territorial conflict with Üüshin
 and to satisfy his own hatred of the PRPIM, Jamiyangshirab had
 Prince Ga (as his name was abbreviated) petition Suiyuan province
 for an investigation of the irregularities in Üüshin banner. This time
 there was to be no escape for the Public Council government; the en-
 suing report connected the whole organization - villages, council,
 and militia - to the "Red Party", abolished them all, revived all the
 old powers of the prince, and after sending Möngkhe-Öljei to worship
 at Chinggis Khan's bier in Jasag banner, stripped him of all his posts
 (Buyan et al. 1982: 418-421). He along with two old company heads
 moved to Khanggin banner; when the company heads returned to
 their hometowns, they escaped detection for a year but were even-
 tually caught and executed by the agents of the Grand Duke Tegiis-
 Amugulang. Möngkhe-Öljei took warning and never returned home
 again.
 Like many parties, such as the Communist Party of China or the
 Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party in Northern Mongolia, the
 PRPIM began as the amalgamation of several small groups, which
 continued as factions within the party. Such cliqueism was especially
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 persistent in Inner Mongolia, where it took its basis from territorial
 and cultural divisions within Inner Mongolia. At the same time,
 these regions had closer economic ties with the neighboring Chinese
 regions than with each other. The only common center of Inner Mon-
 golian intellectual and political life was Beijing. Cities like Baotou or
 Zhangjiakou could serve only as temporary centers - lacking any
 major religious, educational, or governmental institutions their per-
 manent ties were only local, with almost exclusively mercantile. Yet
 the same could be said of the Chinese Communist base areas during
 the period of the Soviet Republic (1931-1936). Here, too, the party
 was territorially dispersed into small cells, based in border regions
 which economically had closer ties with their Nationalist-controlled
 respective regional centers than with each other. Likewise, the cradle
 and long-term center of the party, Shanghai, was the enemy's strong-
 hold as well. Why then were the cells and activists of the PRPIM
 eventually absorbed into local organizations they had helped to
 create, while the Communists were not?
 It is here that the funeral of Öljeijirgal, described at the beginning
 of this paper, takes on a greater significance. The PRPIM was not an
 ideological party. Such aims as it had - destroying the warlords,
 driving imperialism out of Inner Mongolia, implementing autonomy
 and self-determination - related not to an eschatological world-view
 but to the creation of an unified national organization. Believing in
 the desirability of these policies did not result in any alienation from
 local society or in holding any particular position on disputes within
 that society. Nor did it necessarily result in any understanding or in-
 terest in world-wide events - the one published discussion by öljei-
 jirgal of Japanese aggression in Inner Mongolia is of breath-taking
 naïveté (Edünkheshig, et al. 1981: 285). The Buddhist world-view of
 Öljeijirgal and the party members he recruited, was, despite a year of
 study in Ulaanbaatar, little different from that of the more conscious
 and articulate members of the local Üüshin banner society he had
 left. For the Communists to participate in a religious ceremony, or a
 secret society, was an act of insincerity, putting on the guise of a
 member of local society, when in fact one was not. But for many of
 the Mongols in PRPIM, their brief training could not make them
 strangers to the village to which they would return, and to its world-
 view. They might well be willing to try to follow directives from the
 party center, and, indeed, in documents as late as 1930, the Üüshin
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 party committee was begging the Central Committee in Ulaanbaatar
 for some guidance. Deprived of it, they were unable on their own to
 follow a revolutionary policy.
 The PRPIM's goals were primarily political: social and cultural
 revolution did not play a part. Moreover the leaders displayed a per-
 sistent opportunism that prompted them to seek alliances with local
 forces, a policy that led to rapid expansion of the party ranks at the
 cost of discipline and uniformity. But without a gap of ideology be-
 tween the activists and the society in which they moved, it seems un-
 likely that any policy could have, in the long run, avoided this inability
 to keep the party and society distinct. Strikingly, where a revolution-
 ary transformation of Mongolian society did succeed, it did so by fol-
 lowing a great expansion in modern education that made of the gap
 between the traditional and the modern a chasm. In the Mongolian
 People's Republic, the military victory of 1921 did not produce a so-
 cial revolution until the 1930s, when the secular-educated generation
 came of age, while the social revolution in eastern Inner Mongolia in
 1945-1947 followed the great expansion of modern education that
 began with Japanese rule in 1931.
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